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Introduction
Institutions do not only emerge to deliver appropriate answers to local problems (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996), they may also arise from intensive collective struggles where activists combine their efforts 
to challenge existing institutions and propose new ones (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006). There is a 
growing body of literature which acknowledges that social movements can play an important role 
in institution emergence (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). They have been found to be a powerful 
engine in shifting institutional logics in professional settings (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 
2002; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003), forging new institutional logics (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010), 
legitimating products (Rao, 2002) and new practices (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007), shaping iden-
tity (Markowitz, 2007; Rao et al., 2003), facilitating the emergence of technological standards 
(Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002), supporting new organizational forms (Rao, 1998; Rao, 
Morrill, & Zald, 2000; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005) and creating new markets (Fligstein, 1996; King 
& Pearce, 2010; Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008).
Fundamentally, social movements need to mobilize actors and resources in order to change a 
given situation. At the same time, those who resist the proposed change need to organize in order 
to protect the status quo. One of the main and most powerful tools that activists can use to attack 
defenders of the status quo are collective action frames, which refers to strategic arguments 
deployed to mobilize activists (Benford & Snow, 2000). In response, resisters can mobilize 
defensive arguments. Through collective action frames, activists, resisters and other parties may 
engage in framing contests; i.e. struggles over meaning (Benford & Snow, 2000; Guérard & 
Langley, 2012). Yet most of the studies in the extant literature focus on the framing activities of 
the movement (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996b), 
without explicitly looking at the resistance and the counter-framing activities of the parties under 
attack (e.g., Rao et al., 2003; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005; Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber et al., 2008, 
and see also the comment of Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006) or, when they have done so, their 
analysis has been more static rather than process focused (e.g. Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Consequently, little empirical research has explicitly looked at 
the framing activities deployed by both the proponents and opponents of new norms or rules and 
how framing contests evolve and unfold over time to enable institution emergence. As Hardy and 
Maguire (2008) and Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) remark, the literature has primarily focused 
on ‘actor-centric analysis’ where the voices of activists or institutional entrepreneurs have been 
prominently heard and where the resistance of those under fire has been mainly overlooked.
In order to explore how framing contests evolve over time enabling institutional change, we 
conducted an in-depth longitudinal case study analysis. We selected the case of the diesel particu-
late filter (DPF) for diesel cars in Germany because it features extremely dichotomized parties 
with incompatible goals – namely, the car industry and the environmental movement in Germany. 
The case is characterized by the mobilization of 97 social movement organizations that were 
requesting the German car manufacturers to equip diesel cars with DPF in order to reduce pollu-
tion. This gave rise to intense framing contests wherein manufacturers largely resisted the propo-
sition of the environmental movement to make the DPF a de facto standard, that is, a standard that 
is not imposed through regulation but emerges from the bottom up (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 
1997; Kim & Pennings, 2009). Our analysis focuses on how struggles between proponents and 
opponents of the DPF evolved over time and how normative institutions emerge. By normative 
institution we understand ‘conceptions of the preferred or desirable’ (Scott, 2008, p. 54). 
Conceptually, we draw on the social movement literature, on institutional theories and on the 
notion of turning point, which refers to a descriptive term representing ‘consequential shifts that 
redirect a process’ (Abbott, 1997, p. 101).
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By comparing collective action frames of both parties involved in framing contests, this study 
contributes to the literature on institutional emergence in three ways. First, we develop a dualistic 
process model of institutional emergence characterized by deeply grounded opposition between 
parties involved in a conflict that is reflected in a multiplicity of framing contests and of turning 
point mechanisms. Dualism refers here to the fundamental opposition between parts of a whole. 
We show that, in order for the conflict to progress toward the emergence of an institution, frames 
of the challengers of the status quo must reach a certain threshold in order to become a turning 
point mechanism. We define turning point mechanisms as the critical elements that change the 
course of a process in a new direction and which are key for the emergence of new institutions, new 
phases, new conflicts or new events. Three turning point mechanisms are of particular importance 
in our case: local objectification, movement legitimacy and critical actors taking action. Second, 
we show that the party under attack tends to deploy buffering strategies to protect its integrity and 
to reinforce the status quo. Buffering involves two tactics: disciplining the troops and de-legitimiz-
ing the challengers of the status quo. Finally, our results suggest that institutions emerge not only 
by general consensus, synthesis or objectification, as is often assumed in the literature, but also as 
a result of the power exercised by critical actors responding to the imperative of the social 
movement.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first describe the theoretical background 
of our study. We then explain the research context, the scope and the methodology. This is followed 
by a chronological presentation of the case study, drawing particular attention to the framing con-
tests that unfolded on both sides of the interaction as well as to the factors that allow conflicts to 
evolve. We end the paper with a discussion on the theoretical implications of our findings and a 
conclusion.
Theoretical Background
Most of the models of institutional emergence taking a neo-institutional stance (Greenwood et al., 
2002; Marichal, 2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) involve a mechanism of increased objectification 
(Scott, 2008). While these models are based on a consensus-building assumption, the so-called 
cultural-frame institutionalism perspective takes a different stance by assuming that institutional 
projects are the fruit of institutional entrepreneurs or activists who see in them an occasion to real-
ize their interest (DiMaggio, 1988) or their ideology (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). This implies 
that institutions can emerge from political actions or social movements that intend to challenge the 
status quo (Rao, 1998) and often involve a synthesizing mechanism conciliating antithetical posi-
tions (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006). The social movement literature suggests that challengers of 
the status quo can mobilize resources and people by elaborating collective action frames (McAdam 
et al., 1996b), which are ‘intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner 
bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’ (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). From this 
perspective, framing is a strategic process that may lead to the production of frames which are 
defined as the ‘outcome of negotiating shared meaning’ (Gamson, 1992, p. 111). It is the 
‘conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and 
of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (McAdam et al., 1996b, p. 6).
Framing can be broken down into three core tasks (Benford & Snow, 2000). The diagnostic 
framing task is the process by which problems are identified. The prognostic framing task is related 
to the identification of a solution to these problems. The motivational framing task provides a 
rationale for engaging in a movement (Benford & Snow, 2000). These basic tasks have to be com-
plemented by other factors in order for frames to resonate, i.e. to be effective. The proffered frames 
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must be credible and relatively salient – i.e. central and coherent – in terms of beliefs, values, ideas, 
myths and everyday life of the targets of mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000). Regarding salience, 
scholars have come to realize that actors must draw from a repertoire of frames (Clemens, 1993; 
Kaplan, 2008) or master frames (Benford & Snow, 2000; Creed et al., 2002) to elaborate legitimate 
accounts, otherwise their frame may not resonate. Also, actors who are the developers and carriers 
of collective action frames have to be perceived as credible (Kaplan, 2008). If frames do not 
resonate, different tactics can be used to increase the mobilization of participants in a movement 
(Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). One of these tactics is frame transformation, which 
involves changing the content of a frame in order to promote new values but having the same 
finality as the original frame.
While the concept of framing has been mainly used in the social movement literature to explain 
strategies for acquiring resources, recruiting new members or mobilizing adherents (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996b; McCarthy & Zald, 1977), there is recent interest in under-
standing how social movements affect institutional change (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Schneiberg 
& Lounsbury, 2008). These works are largely based on the assumption that societies are so com-
plex and heterogeneous (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Friedland & Alford, 1991) that there is 
wide scope for conflict to arise and for actors to engage in wars over signification. While most of 
the literature on social movements documents the action of movement against the state (King & 
Pearce, 2010), several other actors such as professionals, key suppliers, consumers and other 
organizations may also engage in framing activities and shape institution emergence (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). However, if the framing activities of several actors having divergent interests 
collide, framing contests may ensue. Building on and extending previous work, we define a framing 
contest as the struggle over meaning that attempts to influence the action and the interpretative 
schemes of various audiences having a direct or an indirect interest in a certain issue.
Studies that have considered politics, social movements or framing activities to be central in 
the process of institutional emergence can be grouped into two categories: those developing static 
theoretical accounts (Rao, 2002; Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber et al., 2008) and those that are more 
processual in their scope (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005). Taking the 
former groups of studies as a whole, they suggest, for example, that the number of social move-
ment organizations in a given field militating for solutions to particular problems increases the 
likelihood of the institutionalization of these solutions. They also show that social movements 
provide solutions, values, norms and social structures to facilitate the work of entrepreneurs fac-
ing different challenges associated with the creation of new markets or new market opportunities. 
While these studies are extremely helpful in understanding which variables are crucial to the 
understanding of institutional emergence, they do not theorize the process by which institutions 
emerge over time. For example, Weber et al. (2008) show how a social movement contested the 
current meat and dairy industrial product system by proposing the production of grass-fed meat 
and dairy products, but does not theorize how the institutional emergence process evolves over 
time or how the proponents and opponents of a cause react when they are under attack.
Furthermore, these studies tend to focus exclusively on the activities of the proponents of 
changes rather than theorizing the activities of those defending the status quo. Other studies have 
taken up this challenge by taking political actions into account, explicitly comparing the framing 
and counter-framing activities of rivals engaged in struggles over meaning (Rao, 1998; Rao et al., 
2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). These studies suggest that the frames receiving greater polit-
ical support from influential players in a given field are likely to become dominant (Rao, 1998). 
Institutional emergence may also be sparked in professional settings when the number of prior 
defections to an old institution by peers having a good reputation has reached a critical mass and 
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when defectors gain from adhering to the new logic (Rao et al., 2003). While these studies empirically 
look at proponents and opponents of change, their comparative analysis is rather static, leaving 
aside the processes of framing contests over time. Furthermore, other studies have suggested 
process models of institutional emergence, as we will see in the next section.
Process Models of Institutional Emergence
The process models of Tolbert and Zucker (1996), Greenwood et al. (2002), Nigam and Ocasio 
(2010), Marichal (2009) and den Hond and de Bakker (2007) explain the institutionalization of new 
innovations, logics or practices. Most of these studies stem from Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) 
work which suggests that a mechanism of ‘increased objectification’ (Scott, 2008) – i.e. a process 
that is based on an increased consensus among actors that an innovation or a practice is worthy – is 
involved in institutional emergence. In all these models, framing or theorization1 (Soule, 2004; 
Strang & Meyer, 1993) plays a central role as it is necessary for objectification to occur. Interestingly, 
framing occurs relatively late in several of these process models as it depends on the technical 
viability of the innovation before being framed or theorized. The process model of Nigam and 
Ocasio (2010) is different in that it places framing not as a mechanism which intervenes late in the 
process of institutional emergence, but as present from the moment that an event mobilizes the 
attention of actors. Furthermore, in order for new logics to emerge, both representation and framing 
must be involved to consolidate new logics. These process models typically theorize the activities 
of the proponents of change and do not explicitly address the reactions of those defending the status 
quo. Consequently, politics and conflicts often play a secondary role (except perhaps in the paper 
by den Hond and de Bakker (2007) which documents the action of activists).
However, the dialectic process model of institutional innovation (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006) 
explicitly brings the political dimension into the picture. This model suggests that conflicts involv-
ing actors defending contradictory positions (thesis-antithesis) can be resolved by a synthesis that 
would satisfy the position of the stakeholders involved. Three phases are depicted. In the emergence 
phase, actors signal their intention to address social issues. In the developmental phase, new net-
works of individuals emerge and challenge the status quo in order to gain support and legitimacy. 
Through political behaviour, such as bargaining or negotiation, a synthesis is produced and leads to 
the last phase, namely, the implementation and convergence phase, where the synthesis becomes the 
thesis, which is going to be challenged in a new dialectic cycle. Again, in this model, a synthesis – a 
form of consensus – has to be reached in order for a novel institution to emerge.
Another important account, which conceives institutional emergence as a contested process 
and where social movements play a critical role, is the work of Schneiberg and Soule (2005). They 
show that institutionalization is a temporary ‘settlement of political conflicts over competing 
models of organization’ (Scheiberg & Soule, 2005, p. 152). The originality of their approach is to 
build a multilevel process model wherein the mixed and uncoordinated reactions of those under 
fire from the social movement, the government in that case, are documented at different levels. 
What is interesting in their theorization is that, while the national level agreed to regulate accord-
ing to the social movement’s demands, the lower governmental level framed issues differently and 
only partially implemented the new regulation. This is one rare instance where the reaction of 
those attacked by a social movement was theorized.
Overall, one group of studies documents the key factors that intervene in institutional emer-
gence by looking at those that challenge current institutional arrangements (Rao, 2002; Sine & 
Lee, 2009; Weber et al., 2008), and by documenting the competing institutional work of rivals 
(Rao, 1998; Rao et al., 2003). Another group of studies is more dedicated to understanding the 
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process of institutional emergence by elaborating the stages that are required for a consensus to 
build up, thereby shaping the emergence of institutions (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Greenwood 
et al., 2002; Marichal, 2009; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). However, none of 
the studies from either group documents in detail how framing contests evolve over time by look-
ing at both sides of the conflict.
While some of these studies document the phases that lead to institutional emergence and often 
implicitly follow the general scheme of institutionalization-deinstitutionalization-reinstitutionali-
zation (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), none of 
them are explicit when it comes to theorizing the mechanisms involved in order to account for how 
one phase succeeds another. To understand this process in the emergence of an institution, we draw 
on and extend the concept of turning points (Abbott, 1997) as an endogenous mechanism explain-
ing these shifts.
Turning Points
While external jolts (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1996) or events (Hoffman, 1999; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010) can certainly spark a system or 
a field to change or to transit from one stage to another, mechanisms endogenous to field dynamics 
can also account for such transitions. One concept that can describe how stages succeed one another 
is the notion of turning points, defined by Abbott (1997, p. 101) as ‘consequential shifts that redi-
rect a process’. Turning points can be understood as the transitions between relatively stable trajec-
tories. On a graph, turning points are recognizable by an abrupt change in the curve, preceded and 
followed by a period of relative stability. The concept of turning point has been typically used in 
stage theories in various disciplines such as economics to explain business cycles (Chaffin & 
Talley, 1989; Zellner, Hong, & Mia, 1991), or in political science (Lasser, 1985). However, to our 
knowledge, neither this concept nor anything similar has been used in institutional theories or the 
social movement literature to account for institutional emergence.
The concept of turning points has to be understood as a process. Indeed,
a turning point is not an isolated event of short duration. Nor does it entail a sudden jump from one phase 
to another. A turning point is a process involving the alteration of…path, of a ‘course correction’. A turning 
point requires, therefore, certain strategies and choices. (Hareven & Masnoka, 1988, p. 274)
Turning points are descriptive. As such they describe, a posteriori, the transitional phases that 
affect subsequent events, albeit without specifying the mechanisms involved. Consequently, turn-
ing points may encompass a range of mechanisms. For this reason, we use the term turning point 
mechanism as an overarching concept to account for shifts from one phase to another.
Research Context and Methodology
Research Context and Scope of the Research
Due to the context-sensitive nature of our inquiry (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003) and our focus on pro-
cess data (Yin, 2003), we used a case study approach with embedded units of analysis. Specifically, 
this case documents the activism of environmentalists urging the German automotive industry to 
reduce the emission of particulate matter by introducing the DPF technology. The final outcome 
that we attempt to explain is not regulative, but normative, since we investigate how the emerging 
demand forced the car manufacturers to react so as to include the DPF technology as default 
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equipment in diesel cars in Germany only. Thus, this case takes place within Germany from the 
mid-1980s to mid-2005, when the car manufacturers largely gave in and announced that they 
would equip all their diesel cars with DPF as standard.
We selected this case for two reasons. First, experts from both the German environmental move-
ment and the automotive industry identified this case as having the potential to reflect intensive 
framing contest activity. As Germany is recognized as having both a powerful automotive industry 
and particularly active environmental NGOs, we expected to observe several instances of intense 
struggles for meaning. The automotive industry, both automobile manufacturers and automobile 
component suppliers, constitutes one of the most important industrial sectors in Germany, account-
ing for 866,000 employees, and 17 percent of the entire export volume (Heneric, Licht, & Sofka, 
2005). The industry’s joint interest group is the German Association of the Automotive Industry 
(VDA). Between 2001 and 2010, the average annual domestic production of cars amounted to 5.3 
million. The main actors are German original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) such as Volkswagen 
(VW and Audi), Daimler (Mercedes-Benz and Smart), BMW and Porsche, and also foreign car 
manufacturers with a strong domestic manufacturing presence, such as Ford and General Motors 
(Opel). The environmental movement is also extremely powerful and institutionalized in Germany, 
having 900 organizations and about 3.5 million members (Brand, 1999; Carter, 2007). The main 
actors are BUND (German Association for Environment and Nature Protection), DUH (German 
Environmental Help), Greenpeace, NABU (Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union) and 
VCD (Traffic Club Germany).
Second, although it is embedded in a wider context of emission regulations, the case is well 
confined to Germany. All our interview partners stressed that the heated public debate on diesel 
particulate matter and the DPF was an endemic German phenomenon. For example, Louis 
Schweitzer, the former CEO of Renault (1992–2005), said ‘The discussion about the soot filter for 
diesel cars is typical German and not at all a topic in France’ (Die Welt, April 10, 2005). In fact, as 
our case analysis will show, the debate in Germany was only indirectly linked to the emission 
regulations: Due to the pressure from customers, the German car manufacturers decided to install 
DPF systems (as standard equipment) significantly before the Euro 5 emission norm made it 
essential in 2009.
Technical Background
During the last 20 years, diesel-powered cars have become very popular in Germany. Compared to 
spark-ignition engines (running on petrol), diesel engines emit a relatively high amount of particu-
late matter (PM). Diesel exhaust PM is a complex mixture of different substances but its main 
component is carbonaceous soot. To characterize the wide distribution of the particle sizes, it is 
common to distinguish fine (PM10 with a diameter < 10 μm and PM2.5 with a diameter < 2.5 μm) 
and ultrafine (with a diameter < 0.1 μm) particles. Diesel exhaust PM is a significant anthropogenic 
source of the overall PM concentration in the atmosphere.
As there is accumulated empirical evidence (for a review, see Pope & Dockery, 2006) that sug-
gests a link between the ambient air concentration of PM and adverse health effects (particularly 
respiratory and cardiovascular effects), PM emissions are regulated in many countries. Within the 
EU, the corresponding regulatory environment is formed by two bodies of regulation: (1) exhaust 
emission standards which set upper limits to the amount of pollutants (such as PM) that are allowed 
to be discharged from a vehicle’s tailpipe into the environment; and (2) air pollution standards 
which set upper limits to the concentration of pollutants in the atmosphere. Since the introduction 
of the first exhaust emission standards, several amendments have progressively tightened the limits 
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for diesel PM emissions. The standards are commonly referred to as Euro 1 (1992, diesel PM < 140 
mg/km), Euro 2 (1996, diesel PM < 100 mg/km), Euro 3 (2000, diesel PM < 50 mg/km), Euro 4 
(2005, diesel PM < 25 mg/km) and Euro 5 (2009, diesel PM < 5 mg/km).
In order for their diesel engines to comply with the increasingly stringent PM emission regula-
tions, car manufacturers can basically use two approaches: (1) internal engine methods and (2) 
exhaust after-treatment methods (Eastwood, 2008). In the former, there are several techniques that 
optimize the combustion so that the engine produces less PM. Among other things, a popular direc-
tion is to burn the diesel fuel in a well-controlled mix of excess air (‘lean burn’) (Dunn-Rankin, 
Miyasato, & Pham, 2008). In the other approach, the exhaust gas can be cleansed of PM using DPF 
systems, which are installed between the engine and the tailpipe. While a DPF can reduce PM very 
effectively, it involves a number of technical challenges (thermal robustness, regeneration mecha-
nisms and counter-pressure). For example, Daimler introduced the first diesel car with a DPF 
system (Mercedes-Benz 300 SD) in 1985 in the USA, but after three years ceased commercializa-
tion due to significant technical problems. These challenges, however, were tackled later and, in 
2008, Eastwood (2008, p. 294) noted that ‘forthcoming statutory limits are unlikely to be met by 
any other means [than the DPF]’.
Data Collection
We collected data from several sources. First, twelve in-depth interviews of 60 to 120 minutes were 
conducted with different experts and activists in order to gain a good representation of the main 
arguments and events which occurred in the case. Three interviews were conducted with key man-
agers and engineers of automotive OEMs in Germany, five with environmental activists, two with 
members of the German government, one with a car expert and one with an expert on environmen-
tal issues. These interviews provided the basis for the case study. We started each interview with an 
open-ended question inviting the interviewee to tell the story of the DPF in Germany spontane-
ously, with emphasis on the arguments that were elaborated by the different constituents involved 
in the case study.
While these interviews allowed us to construct the backbone of the case study, we needed to 
complement this data with written documents to avoid memory bias (Eisenhardt, 1989), to identify 
with greater precision the dates of important events (Langley, 2009) and to triangulate our data in 
order to obtain an accurate case narrative (Yin, 2003). Our point of departure was a large, meticu-
lously collected set of German newspaper articles (255 articles from 1997 to 2006) on the DPF 
debate, which we obtained from one of the interviewees. These articles provided an overview of 
the positions taken by different actors in the case (e.g. automotive OEMs, NGOs, government) and 
of the important events. To augment this source, we performed a series of articles searches using 
LexisNexis, a major news retrieval database that covers a large part of the German newspapers and 
business press. To reduce the risk of missing important information, we used a broad time frame 
(1985–2007) and searched for articles containing the word ‘diesel’ in combination with important 
keywords (including their variations and synonyms) identified from the interviews and the initial 
set of articles (e.g. ‘soot’, ‘particulate matter’, ‘health’, ‘cancer’, ‘filter’, ‘eolys’, ‘no diesel without 
filter’). After the removal of duplicates, this search yielded 5,112 articles. We eliminated car 
reviews (because they do not reflect collective action frames) and restricted the scope to daily, 
weekly, and monthly periodicals with a larger circulation and of different political orientations 
(e.g. Die Welt, Frankfurter Rundschau, Handelsblatt, taz, Die Zeit, Stern, Der Spiegel). After nar-
rowing the relevant time frame (see further details below), we arrived at a base article corpus of, in 
total, 2,685 articles (approximately 1.5 million words).
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We also reviewed scientific publications that address the PM debate and DPF technology from 
a technical and epidemiological perspective (journals, conference proceedings, dissertations) to 
augment our understanding of the case. However, we refrained from including these documents in 
our data analysis, because these sources do not report collective action frames.
Data Analysis
To analyse the data, we used an open-ended approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). As we are inves-
tigating processes by which framing contests evolve over time and lead to institution creation, case 
narratives are indicated to capture the effect of time in our analysis (Langley, 1999). Consequently, 
we began by building a case narrative out of our interviews, which were transcribed by a profes-
sional typist. To this end, we arranged all available articles chronologically to obtain a reliable 
timeline of the events that constitute the case narrative. This allowed us to evaluate whether we had 
a sufficiently interesting story to tell (Siggelkow, 2007) and to identify which aspects were more 
promising for a theoretical contribution. The timeline suggested that the case takes place between 
1985 and mid-2005, i.e. from the moment that public attention turned to PM emissions to the 
moment at which the car manufacturers gave in and agreed to equip all their diesel cars with DPF 
systems as standard. Next, we compared the timeline with the case narrative obtained from our 
interviews and adjusted it according to the written documents. This decision is based on the 
assumption that written documents are more reliable given that interviewees often have difficulties 
in recalling dates. Thus, this approach avoids chronological biases (Langley, 2009) and allows for 
the triangulation of our data, thereby further substantiating our case study (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Based on the case narrative, we conducted a detailed manual frame analysis (Goffman, 1974) 
which implies the systematic study of how actors deploy meaning to affect interpretation (Kaplan, 
2008). In order to increase the likelihood of capturing interesting phenomena, we coded our data 
along several dimensions, as shown in Table 1. To handle the large article corpus (2,685 articles), 
we started by coding a sample of 30 articles per month (if available) with each sample equally 
distributed across the entirety of the month. If a saturation point was reached after coding the 30 
articles (Eisenhardt, 1989) – that is, when we determined that the same arguments were repeated 
and further reading would not provide new information – we stopped, otherwise we continued 
coding additional articles until we attained saturation. In total, the frame analysis covered 577 
articles.
Specifically, we focused on identifying excerpts that constitute collective action frames, that is, 
schemata of interpretation that are deliberately developed and carried out by proponents, oppo-
nents and their audience to ‘fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action’ (McAdam et al., 1996b, p. 6). We used the typology of 
Benford and Snow (2000) to classify our material in terms of the tasks the frames were accom-
plishing in the case study. This typology has a long tradition (e.g. Snow et al., 1986), is well-
established (Davis et al., 2005; McAdam et al., 1996b) and is extensively used in the organization 
theory literature (e.g. Kaplan, 2008; Weber et al., 2008). Accordingly, citations that identified a 
problem were coded as diagnostic frames. Excerpts that proposed a solution were coded as prog-
nostic frames, and citations that invoked any kind of incentives to shape or affect the behaviour of 
actors were coded as motivational frames. In addition, for each frame we coded whether the under-
lying intention was in favour (‘pro’) or against (‘con’) the DPF, the articulator (‘who’), the source 
of the excerpts (i.e. from where the document was taken) and the date of the document from which 
it was taken,in order to retrieve the material easily and to follow the chronology of events. To deal 
with the large number of different excerpts, we followed a technique similar to that developed by 
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Gioia (e.g. Corley & Gioia, 2004), which seeks to identify the frames and the main themes animat-
ing the debates about the DPF. Each excerpt was categorized along an increasing level of abstrac-
tion from first-order theme, to second-order theme, and finally to the aggregate level (see Table 1). 
The clustering logic was to pool together excerpts according to their similarity, i.e. high similarity 
within a category, high dissimilarity between categories. This method facilitated the identification 
of collective action frames that correspond to the second-order themes (e.g. ‘devaluation of diesel 
car without diesel filter’). We identified six aggregated themes that correspond to the pooling of 
frames having related content. For example, the collective action frame ‘devaluation of diesel car 
without diesel filter’ was classified under the aggregate theme ‘economic risks and benefits’ 
because it talks about the economic risks customers incur if they choose to buy a diesel car with or 
without DPF. The aggregate themes identified were: (1) public health issues; (2) risks and benefits 
of the technology; (3) behaviour (in)appropriateness; (4) cohesion/fragmentation; (5) regulatory 
intervention issues; and (6) economic risks and benefits. All themes emerged completely from the 
data (Agar, 1980). The material was coded iteratively by reading it several times and by adjusting 
and adding new codes as they appeared in the analysis. In practice, we systematically cut every 
quote that we found in our material and pasted it into an MS Excel spreadsheet (because the pivot 
table function allowed us to build synthetic tables quickly). Specifically, to synthesize the data, we 
organized it into a matrix display (Langley, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994) with two columns 
(i.e. in favour or against the DPF) and along the identified timeline. This helped us to identify 
which framing contests were taking place when and around which theme. A selected sample of 
these frames is presented in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. They provide several examples of how the matrix 
display was used and how frames were coded. The material was coded by a native speaker in our 
author team. Besides the coding done by ourselves, a sample of 10% of our excerpts was coded by 
a doctoral student who is a native speaker of German. The interrater reliability was found to be 
good as indicated by a Cohen’s kappa value of .79.
Our analysis showed significant changes in the themes around which framing contests were 
taking place and in the activities of the key actors. Specifically, we observed four major phases 
split by important changes which occur in the framing activities of the social movement and the 
automotive industry. We will analyse and explain these phases and the underlying mechanisms in 
detail in the next sections.
Finally, in order to augment our understanding of the dynamics of the framing contests and the 
turning points, we performed a simple dictionary-based text analysis of our article corpus. 
Following Cho and Hambrick (2006), we constructed several dictionaries of words (generated 
from the manual frame analysis, see Appendix) reflecting major themes around which the framing 
contests revolved (e.g. ‘health’, ‘tax incentives’, ‘value of the car’). After parsing the articles that 
were identified to deal with the DPF debate, we programmed a simple script that binary coded each 
article for each theme. For example an article was coded ‘1’ for the theme ‘health’, if a word of the 
corresponding dictionary appeared in the article, and ‘0’ otherwise. Then, the obtained article-level 
data were aggregated (summation) to monthly time series. The result, Figure 2, will be presented 
in the analysis section.
Case Study: The Diesel Particulate Filter in Germany
Phase 1: Initial Contests and Local Objectification (January 1985 – February 2002)
Diagnostic frames and counter-frames. The first scientific publications on the health effects of 
airborne particulate matter (PM) appeared in the 1980s. Several studies suggested a positive link 
between exposure to PM air pollution and daily mortality rates caused by lung cancer and 
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Table 2. Frames and counter-frames: Phase 1 (January 1985 – February 2002).
Date Aggregate Themes Framing 
tasks
Proponents’ frames Opponents’ counter-
frames
01/85 – 10/99 Public health issues Diagnostic Diesel PM causes health 
problems (cancer, 
cardiovascular diseases, 
inflammatory processes, 
etc.).
Diesel PM enters the 
bloodstream and brain.
Diesel PM has no 
effect on health.
Lack of evidence.
 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic DPFs would be a 
response to lower PM 
emissions.
Technological 
infeasibility.
Internal engine 
methods are a better 
alternative technology
DPFs are too 
expensive to produce.
11/99 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic Diesel cars of German 
manufacturers are 
polluting.
Peugeot’s cars are 
clean because they are 
equipped with a DPF
DPFs are a proven 
solution to lower diesel 
PM emissions.
Due to additive, 
Peugeot’s technology 
is even more polluting.
Peugeot uses the 
DPF to compensate 
its ineffective Euro 3 
diesel engines.
French technology is 
ineffective.
Internal engine 
methods are a better 
alternative technology.
03/00 Public health issues Diagnostic Diesel PM causes health 
problems (carcinogenic, 
leads to inflammatory 
processes, etc.).
Diesel PM enters the 
bloodstream and brain.
Lack of evidence.
10/00 – 08/01 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic/
Diagnostic
ADAC study shows 
that DPFs are effective 
in limiting diesel soot 
particulate emissions.
 
10/01 – 11/01 Economic risks and 
benefits
Motivational DPFs do not increase 
fuel consumption.
The discussion is one-
sided on diesel PM 
and neglects trade-offs 
such as increasing fuel 
consumption.
02/02 Public health issues Diagnostic Diesel particulates cause 
health problems (cancer, 
cardiovascular diseases, 
inflammatory processes, 
etc.).
Diesel PM enters the 
bloodstream and brain.
Diesel soot has no 
effect on health.
Guérard et al. 795
Table 3. Frames and counter-frames: Phase 2 (March 2002 – August 2003).
Date Aggregate themes Framing tasks Proponents’ frames Opponents’ counter-
frames
09/02 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic DPF is the best 
available technology.
Car manufacturers 
could instantly equip all 
their cars with DPFs.
Internal engine 
methods are a better 
alternative technology.
09/02 – 10/02 Regulatory 
Intervention
Motivational Tax incentives should 
be introduced.
Current emission 
standards are 
inappropriate.
 
12/02 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic Filter is effective, even 
children can show it 
(the experiment).
 
 Public health 
issues
Diagnostic Increases the number 
of deaths.
Poses high risks for 
children.
 
 Economic risks 
and benefits
Motivational Filter decreases fuel 
consumption.
Filter increases fuel 
consumption.
 Behaviour (in)
appropriateness
Motivational It is irresponsible to 
not take into account 
evidence that the DPF 
is effective.
The experiment was 
inappropriate because 
it involved children.
02/03 Economic risks 
and benefits
Cohesion/
fragmentation
Behaviour (in)
appropriateness
Prognostic
Motivational
Motivational
Movement is ready 
to support car 
manufacturers which 
would use filters.
Symbolically penalizing 
those who do not use 
filters.
Consumers have no 
willingness to pay for 
environment-friendly 
products.
Ford Germany asks for 
red card to preserve 
solidarity.
German industry 
reacts by sanctioning 
players who are ready 
to collaborate with the 
movement.
03/03 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic The DPF is an effective 
technology.
Alternative technology 
is better.
07/03 Regulatory 
intervention 
issues
Motivational Taxes on diesel cars 
or taxes on diesel fuel 
should be increased
Law should coerce 
introduction of DPFs.
Taxes on diesel cars or 
taxes on diesel fuel will 
not be increased.
 Public health 
issues
Diagnostic Study published by the 
government shows 
that 14 000 people die 
before their time in 
Germany due to diesel 
fine particulates.
 
(Continued)
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Date Aggregate themes Framing tasks Proponents’ frames Opponents’ counter-
frames
08/03 Behaviour (in)
appropriateness
Motivational Saying that 14 000 
Germans are dying 
every year due to 
diesel soot is pure 
panic-mongering.
 Public health 
issues
Prognostic DPFs would increase 
the life expectation in 
Germany.
 
 Public health 
issues
Diagnostic Diesel PM causes 
important health 
problems.
 
Table 3. (Continued)
Table 4. Frames and counter-frames: Phase 3 (September 2003 – August 2004).
Date Aggregate themes Framing 
tasks
Proponents’ frames Opponents’ counter-
frames
09/03 Economic risks and 
benefits
Motivational We [industry] will do 
what the market asks
01/04 Economic risks and 
benefits
Motivational Without a particulate filter 
cars will depreciate faster.
 
02/04 Public health issues Diagnostic 8500 people die before 
their time in Germany.
 
03/04 Public health issues Diagnostic Science has proven that 
soot particulates cause 
health problems.
 
 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic DPF technology is effective.  
04/04 Public health issues Diagnostic Diesel PM causes important 
health problems.
 
06/04 Regulatory 
intervention issues
Motivational Tax incentives favouring 
the introduction of the DPF 
might resolve the problem 
of soot particulate.
Tax incentives might kill 
the diesel car industry 
in Germany.
Tax incentives might kill 
alternative technologies.
07/04 Economic risks and 
benefits
Motivational Cars without filter will 
drop dramatically in value.
 
cardiopulmonary diseases (Dockery & Pope, 1994; Pope et al., 1995; Schwartz, 1991). In 1989, the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (part of the World Health Organization) rated diesel 
engine exhaust gas as ‘probably carcinogenic to humans’ (International Agency for Research on 
Cancer, 1989, p. 42). At that time, some NGOs in Germany started to turn their attention to diesel 
cars and identified their PM emissions as a major public health problem. In 1997, a commentary 
article in Science (Kaiser, 1997), which synthesized findings from extant studies, drew initial 
attention from German newspapers and weeklies on this topic: ‘the strongest association between 
any pollutant and death rates was with fine particles’ (Der Spiegel, November 10, 1997).
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Table 5. Frames and counter-frames: Phase 4 (September 2004 – August 2005).
Date Aggregate themes Framing tasks Proponents’ frames Opponents’ counter-
frames
03/05 Public health issues Diagnostic Diesel particulates cause 
important health problems 
such lung cancer and heart 
problems.
65,000 people die before 
their time due to air 
pollution caused by fine 
particulate matter.
Diesel particulates are 
only a small part of the 
fine particulate matter 
pollution problem.
 Regulatory 
intervention issues
Motivational Ban cars without filter in 
inner cities.
 
 Cohesion/
Excerptation
Motivational To protect the German 
automotive OEM, the 
German government 
delayed the introduction of 
tight thresholds.
 
 Risks and benefits 
of the technology
Prognostic Filters are effective.  
 Regulatory 
intervention issues
Motivational The tax debate has 
negative effects on the 
buying behaviour of the 
consumers.
Regulation would have 
negative effects on 
German car industry.
05/05 Economic risks and 
benefits
Motivational Cars without filters will lose 
dramatically in value.
A loss of €1000 in resale 
price is exaggerated.
 Public health issues Diagnostic Diesel particulates are 
only a small part of the 
fine particulate matter 
pollution problem.
 Regulatory 
intervention issues
Motivational The filter technology will 
only penetrate the market if 
there are tax incentives.
Regulation would have 
negative effects on 
German car industry.
06/05 Behaviour (in)
appropriateness
Mr Y [member of the 
social movement] is a 
trouble-maker for the 
car industry.
The NGOs’ concerns grew as the propagation of diesel direct injection technologies 
(e.g. common rail) during the 1990s led to an increase in the emission of ultrafine particles that 
were suspected of being the most dangerous class of particle (because they can pass through the 
human lung, enter the bloodstream and accumulate in organs):
With the injection technologies of diesel fuel into the combustion chamber, particulate matters became 
smaller and smaller. We have micro-particulates of nano size which can enter not only the lungs and its 
capillaries, but also could enter the bloodstream and end up in the brain. (Environmental activist, interview, 
2010)
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For these reasons and since the PM concentration in many German inner city areas regularly 
exceeded the limits set forth in the early air pollution standards, some environmental NGOs such 
as Greenpeace requested the automotive industry and politicians to develop solutions for the diesel 
PM issue. The car manufacturers reacted by calling into question the validity of the cited studies: 
‘Latest research from the US-Health Effects Institutes shows that there are no measurable effects 
of the exhaust of modern diesel engines on health’ (managing director of the German Automotive 
Industry Association, August 22, 1999).
Moreover, it was argued that diesel cars would contribute only to a small extent to the total 
anthropogenic PM emissions. Given that exhaust after-treatment systems were already available 
for heavy diesel trucks, members of the environmental movement suggested R&D into DPF tech-
nologies (e.g. Greenpeace, 1993). In response, the car manufacturers stressed the technological 
challenges, costs, and trade-offs associated with DPFs: ‘The industry was saying that diesel par-
ticulate filters are not necessary, it’s not possible, it costs too much money’ (Government repre-
sentative, interview, 2010).
Prognostic frames. Against this background, the French automotive OEM, PSA Peugeot-Citroën, 
sensed a market opportunity in Germany and presented a diesel car with a DPF (Peugeot 607 
HDi FAP) at the Frankfurt Motor Show in September 1999. Overall, the car fulfilled only the 
current Euro 3 norm, but emitted very little PM due to a filter system (‘FAP’) developed by 
Faurecia, a French supplier in which PSA held a majority stake. The car model was launched on 
the German market in early 2001 where it was unique in that it was the only diesel car available 
with DPF. Interestingly, PSA targeted the German market exclusively with their DPF system 
(officially, the DPF system was also launched in France, but it hardly sold). The launch was 
accompanied by a marketing campaign including three major TV commercials that compared 
the ‘clean’ Peugeot with the ‘pollutant’ German diesel cars. The marketing campaign increased 
public awareness of the diesel soot issue and highlighted that DPFs are a technologically 
feasible solution.
The German car manufacturers dismissed PSA’s filter technology as ineffective because it 
required a chemical additive which would be more pollutant and toxic than the diesel exhaust itself 
and because the filter needed to be serviced every 80,000 kilometres. Besides, they continued to 
maintain that there was no solid evidence supporting the adverse health effects of diesel PM:
There is a lack of scientific evidence for the interaction of particulates and its effects on human health. 
I doubt that results from rat tests are informative for human health. Epidemiologic studies are lacking and 
need to be conducted. (Manager from BMW, April 18, 2000)
Due to the dispute, environmental NGOs asked ADAC, Germany’s largest automobile club, to 
assess PSA’s DPF technology. In the first half of 2001, ADAC engineers performed a long-term 
durability test of a DFP-equipped Peugeot and compared its emissions to those of a similar-sized 
German car. The results, published in August 2001, indicated that the DPF system functions 
reliably and that it reduces PM emissions to almost zero (10,000 times less PM than the German 
car model).
A long-term emission durability test of a particulate filter-equipped Peugeot 607 HDi passenger car has 
been completed by the Allgemeine Deutsche Automobilclub [ADAC, the German Automobile Club] and 
the Umweltbundesamt [UBA, the German Federal Environmental Agency]. The particulate filter was 
found to function reliably over the 80,000 km long test. Emission tests conducted after the 80,000 km 
showed that the particulate filter removed over 99.9% of the fine diesel particles. The UBA said, the 
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Peugeot 607 HDi tested emitted on average 10,000 times fewer particles than a comparable vehicle without 
particle filter. (Dieselnet, September 2001)
The German car manufacturers did not deny these results but criticized the discussion as naive and 
one-sided on the PM issue: ‘The filter might solve some problems but increases new ones, such as 
[fuel] consumption…’ (CEO of Mercedes car group in Der Spiegel, November 19, 2001)
They contended that only internal engine methods would be able to reduce PM emissions with-
out undesirable side effects. They pointed out their own R&D efforts on these methods and stressed 
that most of their new diesel car models already attained the stricter Euro 4 norm, placing them 
ahead of the Peugeot cars in terms of overall emissions. Table 2 summarizes the main frames and 
counter-frames that were mobilized by proponents and opponents of the DPF during the first phase.
Phase analysis. The most frequently used frames during this initial period can be grouped under two 
core framing tasks: diagnostic (problem) and prognostic (solution). The case started with the activ-
ism of a few environmental NGOs which – based on the results of several scientific studies – iden-
tified diesel car PM emissions as a major public health problem. This set of diagnostic frames, 
which revolved around public health, was directly counter-framed by the car manufacturer through 
denial (lack of sufficient scientific evidence for adverse health effect) and relativization (diesel cars 
account for just a small portion of the total anthropogenic PM emissions). Then, based on the avail-
ability of DPFs for trucks, the environmental NGOs elaborated a prognostic frame (DPF as a solu-
tion to the identified problem) that was directly counter-framed by the car manufacturers by arguing 
that DPFs for cars face too many technical challenges, are too costly, and overall not necessary to 
attain the forthcoming Euro 4 norm (due to become effective in January 2005). The car manufac-
turers invested in internal engine methods as part of their strategy to comply with Euro 4 (and even 
higher) and they sought to protect these investments from environmental disturbances. Thus, this 
first step towards institutional emergence is characterized by completely opposing frames concern-
ing the diagnosis of the status quo (recognition and denial of public health issues) and concerning 
the technical feasibility and reasonableness of a solution to the potential problem. These initial 
contests constitute the necessary conditions for a conflict to erupt. Without a problem and a solu-
tion, it is difficult to engage on an issue with the expectation of reaching some form of resolution.
In this situation, the prognostic collective action frames considering the filter as a solution 
gained significant tangible support to deconstruct the arguments of the automotive industry. 
Peugeot’s DPF technology provided evidence to the first NGOs involved in the future social move-
ment that the filter was a technically feasible solution and thwarted the technological infeasibility 
arguments of the German car manufacturers. As the German car manufacturers counter-framed this 
new development by discrediting PSA’s DPF technology (generally ineffective, not reliable, incon-
venient maintenance, overall more polluting), the automobile club ADAC – generally considered 
as an independent organization with credible car expertise – ran rigorous tests and ‘proved’ that the 
DPF was effective and reliable. This was perceived and acknowledged by the NGOs and the media 
that the DPF was a tangible solution. Germany’s largest weekly news magazine commented: 
‘The new arguments brought forward by the German car manufacturers are losing their credibility 
in the light of these [ADAC’s] results’ (Der Spiegel, September 11, 2001).
The establishment of the effectiveness of the filter being consensually perceived as a tangible 
fact by potential adherents of the nascent social movement is a fundamental element for explaining 
why the social movement was able to attract and mobilize a large number of followers in the next 
phase. In their first letter to the German car manufacturers, the newly-founded environmental 
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coalition requested: ‘Equip diesel cars with soot filters! The technology is available!’ (November 
26, 2002).
As will be explained in a later section, we refer to this increased evidence-based consensus 
among the first NGOs involved in the movement as local objectification. It is local because this 
objectification (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) has the capacity to affect 
potential adherents to the movement and is unlikely to mobilize defenders of the status quo. 
Without such local objectification, the social movement’s mobilization might not have taken place.
Phase 2: Legitimacy Contests and Movement Legitimacy (March 2002 – 
August 2003)
Mobilization. In March 2002, in the face of the German car manufacturers’ persistent resistance, 
some members of the initial environmental movement met with the German car manufacturers to 
state that the NGOs would ‘go to war’ if they would not introduce DPFs. In September 2002, the 
failure of these negotiations pushed several NGOs (Greenpeace, DUH) to campaign more inten-
sively to attract public attention on the PM issue; but the position of the car manufacturers did not 
change:
The German automotive industry considers internal engine solutions to be a smarter approach than after-
treatment, because it avoids the production of particles…The utilization of filter systems leads – according 
to the current state of technology – to higher fuel consumption, higher costs and requires special 
maintenance in order to clean the system from residues. (German Association of the Automotive Industry, 
November 25, 2002)
In parallel and particularly during the national election race (Bundestag election in September 
2002), the environmental movement and PSA were lobbying politicians to support tax incentives 
and to stand up for stricter European exhaust emission standards. Then, in November 2002, a coali-
tion named ‘Kein Diesel ohne Filter’ (‘No diesel without filter’) was officially founded under the 
leadership of DUH and joined by the major German environmental NGOs (BUND, DNR, 
Greenpeace, NABU and VCD). The coalition grew rapidly and after a few months also included 
the World Health Organization, the German Child Protection Association, ADAC, as well as 97 
smaller NGOs. Creating a coalition was considered to be one of the few tactics that would make 
the German car industry move. A government representative stated, ‘Only a coalition has the 
strength to go against the power of the car industry.’ The aim of this coalition was to ‘promote the 
rapid and widespread installation of particulate filters in order to fight against diseases induced by 
diesel soot’ (internal document). Dieselnet reported:
A coalition of German environmental organizations has started a ‘No Diesel Without Filter’ campaign, 
calling on auto manufacturers to voluntarily fit diesel particulate filters (DPF) on all passenger cars sold in 
Germany. The group also called on the government to introduce tax incentives stimulating market 
introduction of DPF equipped cars. (Dieselnet, December 2002)
The fact that the French competitor PSA could introduce the technology was also an argument 
brought forward by the pro-DPF coalition to attack the car manufacturers: ‘If the French manu-
facturers did it, the German manufacturers can also do it.’ In December 2002, in order to support 
their claim that diesel PM is dangerous to human health, the coalition started their campaign with 
a press conference where they conducted an experiment with two German diesel cars – one 
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equipped with a DPF (provided by Faurecia), the other without. The following quote describes 
the experiment which was performed by a three-year-old child:
So we could show that if you monitor the emissions of a normal diesel car with a normal paper tissue, it is 
still white after half a minute. This gives the impression that the car is clean. Then, the child used a special 
white particulate filter tissue. It became black in seconds. It was really impressive. With this experiment, 
we could show that even a paper tissue cannot block extremely small particulates and that we need a 
special tissue with extremely small structure to block them. (Environmental Activist, interview, 2010)
Buffering. After this public demonstration, the pro-DPF coalition approached various German car 
manufacturers to offer their support in exchange for the introduction of the DPF in their fleets by 
mid-2003. Ford Germany was the only one inclined to talk to the coalition and even negotiated 
with PSA/Faurecia with regard to the supply of DPF modules. In order to motivate Ford Germany, 
the coalition gave a red card (by analogy, being sent off the field in soccer) to each German car 
manufacturer except for Ford Germany, which received a yellow card (analogous to receiving a 
warning in soccer). Just after it received a yellow card, one of the top managers of Ford Germany 
called a member of the coalition and asked to be given a red card as well because all the CEOs of 
the other German car manufacturers were angry that Ford Germany had agreed to negotiate with 
the coalition. They threatened Ford Germany with isolation from the German Car Manufacturers 
Association:
Within two hours, I got a phone call from the office of the director of Ford Germany. The assistant of the 
CEO told me: ‘Mr Y, you can’t imagine what is happening. Every five minutes we get phone calls from the 
other CEOs of German car manufacturers. They are telling us that the alliance at the German Association 
of the Automotive Industry…is broken [by Ford Germany]. We have to ask you to give us a red card like 
the others [car manufacturers] because we have to cancel our order with PSA for particulate filters. I know 
it’s absurd to ask PSA to reconstruct that engine without particulate filter, although this engine was only 
available in a series production with particulate filter, but [Ford Germany] doesn’t want to be leader with 
the filter, we want in the years to come to make motors without particulate filters. Otherwise the alliance 
with all the others [car manufacturers] is endangered.’ (Involved Environmental Activist, interview, 2010)
There was strong pressure inside the automotive industry to stay united with the majority of car 
manufacturers who argued that fair competition means setting and attaining emission standards 
and not dictating specific technologies. For example, as the proponents made attempts to mobi-
lize DPF suppliers (Faurecia and others) who had an obvious interest in the success of the pro-
DPF campaign, the German car manufacturers threatened to terminate or curtail their supply 
contracts with these suppliers (later, it turned out that certain DPF suppliers even supported the 
pro-DPF coalition with funds). Likewise, in August 2003, another German car manufacturer 
hinted that it could install DPFs in some of its car models, but it hesitated to be the first mover. 
In parallel, the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), Germany’s central federal authority on 
environmental matters, published an epidemiological study which estimated that 14,000 people 
were dying each year in Germany due to the emission of traffic-related PM. Various seminars 
were held by lung specialists with the aim of informing the public about the consequences of 
diesel PM. Table 3 summarizes the main frames and counter-frames that were mobilized during 
this episode.
Phase analysis. The point of departure of this second phase was the local objectification (i.e. the 
filter perceived as a viable solution) of the proponent’s prognostic and diagnostic frames, which 
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constituted a powerful means for mobilizing homogenous actors. Indeed, using the mobilization 
capacity of the locally objectified frames, the proponents were able to form a coalition around 
organizations and actors whose values resonated with the proffered frames. Their joint goal was to 
promote the DPF as a technological de facto standard. Because the coalition covered a broad range 
of NGOs having different goals (e.g. advocating for children, health and health care, traffic issues, 
environmental causes) with several of them being perceived as more reformative than radical (den 
Hond & de Bakker, 2007), this social movement gained significant legitimacy: ‘This [the coalition] 
is almost unbelievable; it is unprecedented that Greenpeace, scientists and ADAC are sitting 
together in the same boat’ (an epidemiologist in Die Zeit, December 5, 2002). This movement 
legitimacy brings about the turning point of this stage and enables the next phase in the process of 
institutional emergence.
In this phase, however, the movement was still attempting to mobilize. Members of the social 
movement even used a divide-and-conquer strategy in order to deinstitutionalize, i.e. recruit or 
‘proselytize’, members of the automotive industry. The car manufacturers faced difficulties in 
maintaining their cohesion because Ford Germany and the DPF suppliers were ready to cooperate 
with the environmental movement. These attempts at expansion and deinstitutionalization forced 
the automotive industry to buffer such external aggression by disciplining its members, which took 
the form of threatening to terminate or curtail their relationship with some suppliers and Ford 
Germany. This buffering tactic was coupled with efforts to delegitimize the movement. Indeed, 
following the experiment which involved the contribution of a three-year-old child, the car manu-
facturers attempted to delegitimize the movement by arguing that the experiment was abusive and 
unjustifiably emotional because it involved a little child. They also accused the environmental 
movement of inappropriate behaviour when the movement brought into the frame that diesel PM 
kills 14,000 people per year. They dismissed this frame as ‘panic-mongering’. These attacks sug-
gest that the defenders of the status quo, i.e. the automotive industry, were seeking to erode the 
integrity and legitimacy of the challengers of the status quo.
Phase 3: Motivational Contests and Local Objectification (September 2003 – 
August 2004)
In September 2003, on the occasion of the Frankfurt Motor Show, the German car manufacturers 
reacted and announced that they would begin offering DPFs for all cars until mid-2004. They 
stated: ‘We will do what the market asks.’ However, while the DPF would come as standard equip-
ment in cars with larger diesel engines, their plan was to offer the DPF only as an optional extra (at 
an extra charge of €300 to €1,000) for cars with small engines. They argued that DPFs would have 
an unfavourable benefits-cost trade-off for small engines. As the majority of customers were still 
largely indifferent, the response of the car manufacturers meant that most of the German diesel cars 
would still be sold without a DPF. To affect consumer behaviour, the proponents had been pressing 
politicians for the introduction of tax schemes since the national election race in autumn 2002. 
After the denial of the car industry, the proponents intensified these lobbying efforts.
Value of the car. In October 2003, the Federal Environmental Agency (which supported the pro-
DPF coalition) asked EurotaxSchwacke, an independent market research institute well-known for 
its expertise in forecasting market values of used cars, to conduct a study on how the introduction 
of tax incentives would affect the probable resale value of diesel cars. The study projected that, 
after three years, diesel cars without a DFP would have a 5 percent lower resale value than those 
with a DPF. The conclusion was that, given the uncertainty of whether or not tax incentives would 
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be introduced in the near future, customers would be better off if they proactively bought diesel 
cars with pre-installed DPF systems: ‘Customers who buy a new car now but – because of the 
surcharge – decide to pass up a particulate filter, risk experiencing significant financial losses in the 
future’ (Manager from EurotaxSchwacke, quoted in several periodicals, October 26, 2003). Fur-
thermore, EurotaxSchwacke laid out implications for leasing contracts: ‘In cases of leasing con-
tracts that include a fixed residual value, customers will have to pay more for the car than it is 
actually worth’ (Manager from EurotaxSchwacke, quoted in several periodicals, October 26, 
2003).
The environmental movement disseminated the results of the EurotaxSchwacke study and, in 
parallel, continued to push for tax incentives to be implemented.
Tax incentives. At the beginning of 2004, the pro-DPF coalition and the car manufacturers were 
both struggling intensively to persuade the federal government to support them. The proponents 
organized various hearings where NGOs, WHO, physicians and children’s advocacy associations 
presented public health arguments and militated in favour of tax incentives. They reiterated the 
results of an epidemiological study (commissioned by the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), 
Germany’s central federal authority on environmental matters), released in July 2003, which esti-
mated that 14,000 people were dying each year in Germany due to the emission of traffic-related 
PM. The automotive industry was also active in terms of lobbying. As one interviewee put it: ‘They 
complained at the Minister level, at the parliament level, they did everything they could do…It was 
a big fight’ (interview, 2010).
In March 2004, only three hours after the government coalition (green party and social 
democrats) considered that tax incentives to promote DPFs could be an option, the CEO of 
Volkswagen wrote a private letter to the government stating: ‘If you force the [car] manufac-
turers to use this technology [DPF], you will kill the German diesel industry’ (Automobilwoche, 
April 25, 2005).
To signal they were not completely against the DPF, German car manufacturers announced in 
summer 2004 that diesel engine cars having a capacity above 1.6 litres would be equipped with the 
filter. However, cars with lower capacity would still not be equipped due to technical challenges. 
In a rebuttal of the latter argument, the environmental coalition asked suppliers to install a soot 
particulate filter on a microcar. In July 2004, they were able to present a prototype of a DPF system 
inside a microcar (Smart ForTwo cdi with a 0.8 litre engine) and claimed that the filter could be 
manufactured economically. The summary of this phase is shown in Table 4.
Phase analysis. The car manufacturers’ actions remained focused on complying with emission 
norms and on addressing the demands of the customers. They had stated ‘We will do what the 
market wants.’ However, despite the intensive framing of the challengers of the status quo, the 
majority of customers were still largely indifferent. None of the previous frames had resonated 
sufficiently with the car manufacturers or with the majority of customers. For this reason, the DPF 
proponents transformed their diagnostic frames (Snow et al., 1986) into a motivational frame to fit 
the values of the customers, namely, to establish frames that connect the purchase of cars without 
DPF with individual costs, risks, or losses on the part of the car owner. In other words, they trans-
formed their public health frames into an economic incentive frame.
At the same time, the coalition disseminated the frame that ‘many people die in Germany 
because of diesel soot particulates’, which was derived from a credible study commissioned by the 
Federal Environmental Agency. This frame attracted government attention and triggered a discus-
sion on how to motivate customers to buy cars with DPF (ranging from banning diesel cars from 
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inner cities to tax incentives). In reaction, members of the automotive industry counter-framed the 
motivational frames of the movement by reminding the government that such legislation would 
seriously hurt the German car industry, threaten many jobs, and after all be inconsistent with 
European law. While the regulatory intervention frame had already been voiced earlier by the DPF 
proponents, what is specific to this phase is that this frame was powerfully counter-framed by 
threatening the government that tax incentives could ‘kill’ the diesel car technology in Germany. 
These framing and counter-framing struggles gave rise to motivational contests where the aim was 
to mobilize critical actors with reference to whether to maintain the status quo or to create incen-
tives for customers to buy diesel cars with DPF.
In order to move forward, the social movement could not merely rely on their collective 
action frames. Again, the frames had to become locally objectified, meaning that people had to 
see evidence that motivational frames are tangibles, that they have material consequences. The 
process leading to local objectification began by asking EurotaxSchwacke to conduct a study on 
the future resale value of diesel cars without filter. This study highlighted significant losses for 
cars without DPF.
However, the report was not sufficient to generate local objectification. Indeed, in order for 
local objectification to reach a turning point where customers began asking for the DPF, the threat 
of a tax incentive implemented played a crucial role. Although it was not yet clear which direction 
the legislation would take, the permanent discussion created a significant amount of uncertainty 
among customers. So, the combination of the ‘value of the car’ frame with the uncertainty revolv-
ing around tax incentives created the turning point. Leasing firms were the first movers:
We commissioned a study and it concluded that the value of a car without a filter would be about 500 to 
2,000 Euros lower [than a car with a filter] after five years. Our conclusion alarmed leasing companies 
because they rely on the value of used cars to resell their cars…So, leasing companies made a calculation 
on the value of cars after the leasing period. If the value is going down, of course, they have a big loss 
of money. If you buy 100,000 vehicles and each vehicle loses 2,000 Euros above average, you lose a lot of 
money. The study was conducted by a company which evaluates the value of used cars. (Representative of 
the Federal Environmental Agency, interview, 2010)
Phase 4: The Emergence of a Standard (September 2004 – August 2005)
The demand for diesel cars equipped with DPF increased during late 2004 and early 2005:
The German manufacturers have done their homework by equipping their vehicle line-ups with particulate 
filters more quickly than many had expected…Almost 100,000 diesel cars were fitted with particulate 
filters in the first four months of the year. German brands accounted for more than 80 per cent of these 
vehicles, meaning that 30 per cent of the domestically produced diesel cars in Germany are now equipped 
with a particulate filter. (German Association of the Automotive Industry, June 3, 2005)
In April 2005, EurotaxSchwacke updated their initial study on the depreciation of cars without 
filters and reiterated their conclusions. Several newspapers headlined this updated study: ‘Diesel 
cars lose drastically in value’ (Automobilwoche, April 11, 2005), ‘Loss of value without filter’ 
(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, April 11, 2005), ‘Diesel cars without filter lose value rapidly’ (Spiegel 
online, April 11, 2005), ‘Particle filter regulation puts pressure on automobile banks and leasing 
firms’ (Handelsblatt, May 3, 2005). This media coverage on the depreciation of cars without DPF 
provided the final step towards the emergence of the filter as a de facto standard. The demand 
forced the car manufacturers to equip their cars with DPF: they began announcing that the DPF 
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would become a standard for their entire fleet, even before any regulation was passed. For exam-
ple, GM-Opel announced that the DPF would be a standard in Germany in July 2005, Toyota in 
May 2005, and Ford in August 2005:
Beginning this summer, Mercedes-Benz will equip all its diesel passenger cars sold in select countries with 
a particulate filter as standard. It will be the first automaker to do so. The diesel initiative, announced by 
Dr Eckhard Cordes, the Head of the Mercedes Car Group, initially applies in Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. A total of 30 different models are affected. (Green Car Congress, March 
2005)
Toyota will offer its Avensis with a diesel particulate filter by early next year. It is also likely Toyota will 
provide soot filters on its low-end diesel models in Germany and neighbouring markets because consumers 
there demand them. (Just-Auto, May 31, 2005)
Ford…is making Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF) systems available across the heart of its vehicle portfolio 
– including retro-fit systems for the majority of diesel-powered Ford vehicles already in customer’s hands. 
New Ford Motorcraft retro-fit systems will be available to suit a wide range of older Ford models. (Media.
Ford.com, August 2005)
Car manufacturers who did not have contracts with DPF suppliers feared that their share in the 
diesel car market might drop and had to invest heavily in increasing supplier capacity. Indeed, the 
problem was that, even though the car manufacturers wanted to offer DPFs, there was not enough 
supply to equip the large annual volume of German diesel cars.
Initially, the government thought that introducing a tax incentive could be a viable option, but 
the trend of the market was suggesting that there was no longer a need for this:
The idea was to give a tax incentive to customers, but in the end there was no need because if the market 
for diesel cars without filter vanished it would have been useless [to provide incentives]. (Government 
representative, interview 2010)
Key citations for this phase are shown in Table 5.
Phase analysis. In this last phase, the local objectification of the proponents’ ‘depreciation of cars 
without filter’ frame started to affect the customers’ purchasing behaviour and attracted demand for 
cars with DPFs. Crucial in this phase and what brought about the emergence of a de facto standard 
was the mobilization of critical actors who could exercise their power (here purchasing power). It 
is worth noting that the proponents sharpened the frame ‘economic value of the car’ increasingly 
over time. The framing started from ‘cars without filter will lose value’ and ended in the notion that 
reselling cars without DPF might become almost impossible in the near future.2 Because they con-
veyed risk of losing money, these frames resonated with the customers’ values, especially for the 
big leasing companies.
When customers exercise their purchasing power, they leave the automotive industry with two 
choices. Either the industry can comply with customers’ requirements, the market logic commanding 
companies constantly to adjust to demand in order to secure revenues for the firm, or the firms can 
ignore the signals sent by customers, running the risk of going out of business. In any case, the cus-
tomers’ purchasing power and the business decision to comply with, ignore or deny that market 
demand take place within power contests where critical actors decide to allocate resources where they 
are needed. The turning point is reached when the number of critical customers demanding a DPF 
reaches a certain threshold and in our case this was expressed by the proposals that car manufacturers 
806 Organization Studies 34(5-6)
make the DPF a de facto standard for their model, without the need for legal enforcement. Following 
the demand for DPF, car manufacturers agreed to install the technology on their diesel cars.
Analysis
From the findings of our case study, we developed a dualistic process model of institutional emer-
gence. Our model, shown in Figure 1, consists of four phases each characterized by specific 
contests and specific turning point mechanisms (large arrows in Figure 1). In each phase, the 
frames or mobilization efforts of the challengers have to reach a certain threshold in order to 
become a turning point critical for the next framing contests to occur, which feeds the next phase. 
Our case suggests that there are three types of turning point mechanisms: (1) local objectification; 
(2) movement legitimacy; and (3) mobilizing critical actors. Each of these mechanisms contributes 
to producing the transition between phases in our case example. We begin by presenting the 
phases involved for a new institution to emerge and then discuss the role of turning point mecha-
nisms in the process.
The first phase is characterized by an initial contest, which mainly involves the deployment of 
diagnostic (identifying problems) and prognostic frames3 (proposing solutions) by the challenger 
of the status quo, and of counter-frames by the defenders. Identifying a problem, proposing a solu-
tion and the crafting of counter-arguments are the basic necessary ingredients for an initial contest 
to last over time and to evolve to the second phase, the constitution of a social movement and the 
appearance of legitimacy contests.
In the constitution of the social movement, proponents of change attempt both to mobilize 
homogeneous actors in order to expand their influence, such as the 97 NGOs in our case, and to 
deinstitutionalize (having actors joining the movement) central actors who are part of the defenders 
of the status quo. In reaction, defenders buffer the attack of the challengers of the status quo by 
disciplining (Foucault, 1977) those who are willing to join the effort of the social movement and 
by de-legitimizing the movement, i.e. attacking the credibility of the movement (we further develop 
this argument in the next section). Attempts to deinstitutionalize the defenders and de-legitimize 
the movement constitute a legitimacy contest. However, efforts at deinstitutionalizing the defend-
ers or convincing the defenders of the status quo to change may not be sufficient for the new insti-
tution to emerge if the buffering mechanism of the defenders is effective. This encourages the 
social movement to use frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986) in order to convince other actors 
who had not felt concerned by the debate thus far.
Frame transformation marks the beginning of the third phase, which is mainly characterized by 
developing motivational frames, reflected in our case by the elaboration of economic frames taking 
the form of the value of the car and tax incentives in order to increase the sensitivity of or to moti-
vate some actors who are critical of the emergence of novel institutions. Not surprisingly, these 
motivational efforts by the social movement are counter-framed by the defenders of the status quo. 
This constitutes motivational contests wherein proponents and opponents of a new norm attempt 
to mobilize critical actors, customers and, in our case, the government.
In the fourth phase, the activities of the social movement and of the defenders of the status quo 
lead to mobilization contests as both parties attempt to draw customers and the government on to 
their side. If critical actors take action, a normative institution emerges, a de facto standard in our 
case. However, the emergence of a normative institution does not mean that a consensus was 
reached (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) or that a synthesis emerged (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006). In 
a dualistic process model of institutional emergence, the norms emerge, as in our case, out of 
the coercive action of one group over another. In our case, the purchasing power of important 
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customers forced the industry to react even though the latter did not believe in the necessity or the 
effectiveness of the DPF.
Turning Point Mechanisms
The described phases represent the major building blocks of the proposed model. Frames and 
mobilization activities, however, must reach a certain threshold4 in order to become a turning point 
mechanism for further contests to occur. Specifically, our case study results suggest three types of 
turning point mechanisms which provoke new contests and which ultimately lead to institution 
emergence. The fact that frames and mobilization activities can become turning point mechanisms 
is always subject to the counter-force of the frames of the defenders of the status quo.
The first important turning point mechanism is local objectification. It manifests itself in the 
production of consensually perceived evidence that a frame is tangible. As long as this local consen-
sus is not reached, frames may be considered as being merely speculative. In our case, the frame 
‘benefits of the DPF’ was vulnerable to the ‘technically infeasible’ frame articulated by the car 
manufacturers until the manufacturer PSA presented a car with the DPF: this constituted the first 
evidence of the DPF being a socially recognized fact. The frame ‘benefits of the DPF’ reached local 
objectification when additional evidence was generated by ADAC and reified by the members of the 
still embryonic social movement. In the third phase, local objectification was also reached by the 
frame ‘economic benefits of the DPF’ when the report produced by EurotaxSchwacke was released 
which estimated that cars without a filter would lose value, and when the information it contained 
was distributed by the social movement. This last motivational frame played a crucial role in mobi-
lizing consumers. One reason is that, while the social movement could substantiate their claim with 
the reports from EurotaxSchwacke, this frame was only weakly counter-framed by the automotive 
industry. They counter-argued merely by denying the arguments of the environmental movement, 
defending the position that not having a filter did not affect the value of diesel cars. The local objec-
tification of the third phase was particularly crucial because it brought a change in those who had the 
power to alter things, i.e. customers. It actually changed customers’ norms, notably in the leasing 
companies, as they began asking for DPFs when buying diesel cars in order to avoid losing money.
As can be seen after the first phase, the social consensus about the evidence of the effectiveness 
of the DPF is not sufficient. Those who are providing evidence have to be perceived as having 
moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), i.e. perceived as being appropriate to produce evidence, in 
order to elaborate those frames. Without such legitimacy, the evidence is likely to be considered 
peculiar or anecdotal at best. For example, if Greenpeace had produced evidence that filters are 
effective, it is unlikely that the frame ‘benefits of the DPF’ would have mobilized actors. In the 
past, Greenpeace had produced a car prototype called the Smile car that consumed less gasoline 
and it was immediately discredited by the automotive industry. PSA in commercializing the prod-
uct and ADAC as testers of the filter have the legitimacy to produce such evidence in order for this 
frame to reach local objectification.
The second turning point mechanism observed in our case study concerns the legitimacy of the 
movement. The movement became legitimate when it gained credibility in the eye of several con-
stituencies of society, especially homogeneous actors and those concerned with the problems and 
solutions framed by the social movement. In our case, several indications show that the movement 
reached moral legitimacy, i.e. was perceived as appropriate (Suchman, 1995). One indication is the 
composition of the social movement. The fact that highly credible organizations such as the World 
Health Organization and a children’s advocacy association, which are not environmental NGOs 
(though still NGOs), is a sign that the social movement gained substantial legitimacy. Indeed, it is 
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not only the mere number of NGOs joining the movement which indicates legitimacy, but also 
which actors join the movement. Having these two non-radical organizations (den Hond & de 
Bakker, 2007) joining the movement clearly supported the legitimacy of the cause. Our results sug-
gest that once a movement gains moral legitimacy it has the strength to transform its initial frames 
into others as a means to mobilize a larger array of actors. Frame transformation is the term coined 
by Snow et al. (1986) to express the redefinition of the values and meanings of one frame into 
another. Before a social movement reaches moral legitimacy, it is unlikely that frame transforma-
tion will be effective because actors may perceive the movement as marginal and as not having the 
credibility to make some frames resonate. While the concept of legitimacy has rarely been applied 
to social movements, the finding that activists need legitimacy in order to be sufficiently influential 
to promote and replace new logics and identity is not new (Rao et al., 2003). In their paper, Rao 
et al. (2003, p. 804) show that ‘nouvelle cuisine was promoted by activists in the centre of the 
French culinary world’ by those who were already perceived as legitimate in orthodox cuisine, and 
that this involvement was crucial for the nouvelle cuisine social movement to take form.
The third turning point mechanism of our model is critical actors taking action. When direct 
action inviting the defenders of the status quo to change fails, direct action against the defender 
may not be the best course. Instead, mobilizing critical actors such as consumers or the govern-
ment, having some power over the defenders of the status quo, is crucial. Critical actors are those 
who have the necessary power to make the defenders of the status quo reactive in the direction of 
the claims of the social movement. Mobilizing organizations having power – even if this power is 
highly distributed as in the case of several customers asking for a technology (Ansari & Phillips, 
2011) – is necessary to create the bandwagon for a normative institution to emerge. In this perspec-
tive, power can take several forms such as resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) or a 
coercive one (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Once some critical actors are mobilized, other critical 
actors can follow, thereby reaching the point where a critical mass of actors embraces the emerging 
norm by taking action. In our case, the critical actors were the leasing and logistic companies ask-
ing for their fleet to be equipped with a DPF, and other consumers taking action by demanding that 
their cars have the same equipment. To avoid losing their market share, car manufacturers had to 
adjust quickly and those who did not have contracts with filter suppliers lost out. Due to the demand 
for a DPF, car manufacturers began offering this equipment as standard on diesel cars; the technol-
ogy became a de facto standard.
In order to provide additional support to the turning points we observed, we performed an auto-
mated analysis of articles in order to observe the outcomes of the three different turning point 
mechanisms in the case. As shown in Figure 2, the initial frames of the environmental NGOs met 
with relatively little interest in the media. The media attention peaks slightly in response to the 
results of the ADAC study (around August 2001), yet the movement itself and its major public 
health frames are hardly noticed. At the point where the NGOs forge a coalition (after the Bundestag 
election in autumn 2002) and use the locally objectified frames (by PSA and ADAC) to mobilize, 
they gain the legitimacy needed to disseminate their frames on a larger scale (peak of the ‘social 
movement’ theme around November 2002). Later, the local objectification of the ‘public health’ 
frame (around July 2003) as well as the transformed frames ‘value of the car’ (around September 
2003) and ‘regulatory intervention’ (around June 2004) led to smaller peaks in published articles. 
However, in order to move forward, the movement had to pick these objectified frames up and 
mobilize. And indeed, Figure 2 shows for the time around March 2005 that the movement received 
massive media attention together with its two frames, ‘value of the car’ and ‘regulatory interven-
tion’, which ultimately affected the critical actors’ behaviour and brought about institutional 
emergence.
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Buffering strategies
Our model shows that the second phase characterized by legitimacy contests features an attempt by 
the social movement to expand its membership in an attempt to mobilize institutional actors and to 
deinstitutionalize (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007) some members among the defenders of the status 
quo; i.e. to recruit some of them to join the movement (refer to the black arrow and the black box 
in Figure 3). Figure 3 provides an overview of the different elements of the legitimacy contests and 
the buffering behaviour of our model.
The divide-and-conquer strategy used by the social movement may trigger buffering strategies 
from the defenders of the status quo which are characterized by disciplining and de-legitimation. 
Disciplining is the call for unity among the troops in order to avoid sanctions. The way discipline 
is exercised in our case is a form of coercion with the aim of making sure that an entity will be 
sanctioned if it defects to its peers. At the same time, the defenders of the status quo attempt to de-
legitimize the challengers by attacking their identity and their cause. By de-legitimization we 
understand attempts to discredit an individual, a group, an organization or a social movement. 
These attacks and counter-attacks constitute the foundation of the legitimacy contests at the heart 
of the second phase of our model. In our case, disciplining took the form of threatening Ford 
Germany that they would no longer be invited to industry meetings, and de-legitimizing the chal-
lengers by accusing the social movement of panic-mongering. Both disciplining and de-legitimiz-
ing the challengers constitute two important tactics of the buffering mechanism.
Depending on the characteristics of the emerging institution and the setting this dualistic pro-
cess model attempts to explain, several variations of the model may be observed. Phases may occur 
simultaneously since framing and mobilizing activities may be concomitant instead of sequential. 
We may expect simultaneity to occur in periods of acute crisis. Mirroring the phases, turning point 
mechanisms may also take place simultaneously, reinforce each other or appear in a different order. 
Other turning point mechanisms may be involved depending on the context of the framing con-
tests. Several iterations of frame transformation may also be observed if conflicts around an issue 
do not evolve toward a temporal settlement.
Discussion
A dualistic process model of institutional emergence is a promising explanation for institutional 
emergence in conflictual situations involving highly dichotomized parties that allow 
Buffering
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homogeneous
actors
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De-ins
tu
onaliza
on
D
is
ci
pl
in
in
g Expanding
Figure 3. Mechanisms involved in legitimacy contests.
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no possibility for a consensus to emerge (either because the antagonists defend irreconcilable 
positions or because there is no possible intermediate solution to a problem). Dualism refers to 
the fundamental opposition between parts of a whole. Accordingly, the model reflects the funda-
mental opposition between proponents and opponents of the development of new institutions that 
does not rest on the emergence of a synthesis or a consensus, but on the coercion exerted by one 
group of actors over another. This model is characterized by power and conflicts, which materialize 
in multiple framing contests which are punctuated by turning point mechanisms: local objec-
tification, movement legitimacy and critical actors taking action. It also takes into account the 
buffering strategies deployed by the defenders of the status quo to protect themselves from the 
aggression of the social movement.
In the model, power plays a particular role as it is not only the ingredient that allows actors to 
engage in challenging the defenders of the status quo, but it is also the element that allows the 
defenders finally to embrace the desire of the challengers, not because they consensually agree 
with their requirements, as is the case in a dialectical model of institutional innovation (Hargrave 
& Van de Ven, 2006), but because they are forced by economic coercion. In our case, it is the pur-
chasing power of consumers which made the industry adopt a de facto standard. Those who did not 
adopt would face competitive disadvantages and losses in market share. From this perspective, 
coercive power does not lead to synthesis or increased objectification, but to a forced settlement, 
which does not make unanimity among the defenders of the status quo. An important implication 
of this model is that it allows us to take into account not only power and conflict, but also their 
different manifestations and complexity along the emergence of institutions. Because power and 
conflict are omnipresent, the model can also easily account for failure of institutionalization pro-
jects. This can be explained by the failure of turning point mechanisms to reach a critical threshold 
(i.e. the lack of local objectification, of movement legitimacy, of the involvement of critical actors) 
or by strong buffering strategies that inhibit the mobilization efforts of a social movement.
Like the dialectic model of Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006), a dualistic process model of 
institutional emergence considers power and conflict as central, but it also takes into account the 
measure of local phenomena, i.e. occurring on one side of the interaction. Power is not given but 
has to be built up through framing activities or mobilization efforts towards a threshold where 
they become turning point mechanisms that mobilize more adherents to a cause and lead eventu-
ally to institutional emergence. Power is also manifest in attempts of the defenders of the status 
quo to buffer the challengers by using different tactics such as de-legitimation or disciplining. By 
elaborating such a model, which takes into account situations of institutional emergence wherein 
extremely polarized parties confront each other, we respond to the call for more work on extremely 
dichotomized conflicts (Greenwood et al., 2002).
Turning Point Mechanisms
Our dualistic process model of institutional emergence uses and extends the notion of turning 
points (Abbott, 1997) by introducing the concept of turning point mechanisms. While the concept 
of turning point is rather descriptive, we believe that by documenting its implied mechanisms we 
increase the explanatory power of the concept. The implication for research in institutional theory 
and the social movement literature is important because it allows capturing in one concept the key 
elements that are pushing a process in a new direction and enables explanation of shift occurrence 
in stage-like models.
One key turning point mechanism that is part of a dualistic model of institutional emergence is 
the concept of local objectification. Contrary to the notion of objectification, which implies the 
building of an increased general consensus about the value of an innovation among a population of 
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actors (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), local objectification in a dualistic 
process model does not involve a generalized consensus, but rather the distributed perception by 
different groups of actors that a frame is substantive to various degrees. This is much narrower in 
scope as it targets only those who are likely to join a movement or to become activists. The concept 
of local objectification is bound up with the notion of framing contests. It is because there is a 
contest of the validity of some evidence that objectification is localized to those who are likely to 
buy in to what is proposed by the challengers of the status quo. By considering the defenders of the 
status quo as well as their challengers, a dualistic process model of institutional emergence can 
capture what it is that is becoming objectified for each party involved in framing contests. This 
suggests that it is characteristic of turning point mechanisms that they are often local, i.e. they can 
be circumscribed to some individuals, networks, organizations or social movements.
Moreover, local objectification does not necessarily constitute a final product or a state to be 
reached, but is a central mechanism for further mobilization to occur. In a sense, it is a necessary 
condition for the conflict to be sustained and evolve. The reason is that frames must be consensu-
ally seen not merely as speculative, but as being grounded in some evidence, and that this evidence 
should be perceived as valid by some actors who would have an interest (DiMaggio, 1988) in 
believing in it or have their ideology aligned with it (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Local objecti-
fication is echoed in other studies. For example, Rao et al. (2003) showed that the emergence of 
nouvelle cuisine in France was influenced by the evidence provided by the success of famous chefs 
who switched to this new way of preparing food. One may think of the success of these famous 
chefs as a frame which became locally objectified and thus allowed wider mobilization to occur 
and institution to emerge. On the other hand, more traditional chefs were denying nouvelle cuisine 
as an option for them.
Another turning point mechanism is movement legitimacy. While this notion is not new (Zald 
& Ash, 1966), it is the locality of the legitimacy that has implications for research. Because the 
defenders of the status quo are fighting to de-legitimize the movement, the latter has to constantly 
find a way to anchor its legitimacy in society in order to increase or maintain it despite the actions 
of the defenders of the status quo. Thus, movement legitimacy is an ongoing project that has to be 
constantly reaffirmed in order to convince at least some other social movement organizations that 
the cause it defends is worthy.
Critical actors taking action constitutes another turning point mechanism that is part of our 
model. The turning point mechanism nicely complements the notions of tipping points (Gladwell, 
2000; Schelling, 1971, 1978) or threshold (Granovetter, 1978; Granovetter & Soong, 1983, 1986, 
1988). While these concepts are mainly used to explain the final decisive moment when a system 
tips, they neglect all the sinuosity of the processes that take place before a major shift occurs. 
Furthermore, while these concepts attempt to link both the micro and macro levels of analysis, a 
tipping point or threshold is, at its end, essentially a micro-phenomenon as it is situated within the 
person and is influenced by the number of previous adoptions. The notion of turning point mecha-
nism is situated at a more macroscopic level of analysis since it explains shifts occurring in a pro-
cess, although these changes of direction may be local. Furthermore, a turning point allows us to 
account for more minor shifts that occur before a major change in a system. This has considerable 
implications for institutional theories because most institutional models attempt to make broad and 
encompassing models that do not account for local deviation from mainstream events when we 
know that it is precisely these local deviations that may bring about large-scale change over time. 
Finally, we would like to underline that a dualistic model of institutional emergence suggests that, 
as in the work of Gladwell (2000), having critical actors involved in pushing for a solution by taking 
action is extremely influential in producing institutional change or institutional emergence. It is not 
only a matter of numbers, as often implied in the classical concepts of threshold and tipping points.
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Buffering Strategies
While the study of activists’ actions (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007) and of social movements 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996a; McAdam & Scott, 2005) has been extensively documented, 
less studied is the response behaviour of those undergoing an attack from social movements over 
time (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Our analysis suggests that the 
defenders of the status quo resort to buffering strategies to resist the pressure unleashed by the 
challengers.
Initially proposed by Thompson (1967) to explain how organizations create different depart-
ments to protect their technical core, the idea of buffering has been used in many other settings to 
qualify how organizations protect or insulate themselves from environmental disturbances (Bode, 
Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011; Fennel & Alexander, 1987; Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990; 
Oliver, 1991). However, and to the best of our knowledge, this concept has not been used to describe 
the behaviour adopted by a whole industry in order to safeguard its integrity. The buffering mecha-
nism we observe in our study is present in the repeated attempts of the industry to counter-frame the 
arguments of the social movement and is particularly acute in the second phase of our dualistic 
process model of institutional emergence, where legitimacy contests dominated the scene.
Relationships to Other Models
The dualistic process model of institutional emergence complements existing models of institu-
tional emergence. We can distinguish three types of such models: the increased objectification 
models, the institutionalization of conflict models and the political models. Because our model 
accounts for multiple framing contests and is therefore based on conflict, the dualistic process 
model of institutional emergence is distinct from models which are based on the assumption that 
institutional emergence is the result of an increased consensus (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Marichal, 2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Indeed, the increased objecti-
fication models are based on the idea that a consensus arises from the emergence of a shared 
understanding, while in a dualistic process model there is no consensus but a winning camp 
imposing its will.
It is also distinct from the studies that attempt to understand how competing logics or framing 
contests emerge and become institutionalized. These studies show that institutional fields are plu-
ralistic and that, when there is no possibility of framing contests being resolved, the conflict can be 
institutionalized, taking the form of competing institutional logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Purdy & 
Grey, 2009; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). A dualistic process model of institutional 
emergence differs from these models because, while the arguments of the party which loses the 
battle cease to have an active role in the social arena, these arguments continue to be alive in the 
belief system of the defenders of the status quo. Observing a temporary settlement does not mean 
that a consensus is reached, but rather that a temporal solution has been imposed.
Finally, the political models are closer to the dualistic process model of institution emergence 
because they explicitly theorize the role of conflict and politics in institutional emergence. The 
dialectic model of institutional innovation (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006) is based on a Hegelian 
opposition between thesis and antithesis, where the outcome of a confrontation or a contest is a 
synthesis that constitutes the new material for a new confrontation to take place. Because the 
elaboration of a synthesis constitutes the key moment of conflict resolution, the dialectic model 
assumes that the conflict may be resolved at the end by consensus. The den Hond and de Bakker 
(2007) model also involves the resolution of institutional emergence through consensus as the last 
phase of institutionalization, deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization, i.e. a return to a 
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normal situation where past conflicts are overcome. The Schneiberg and Soule (2005) model, 
which elaborated a contested multilevel process model, shares one assumption with ours in that the 
resolution of framing contests is no more than a temporary settlement where new cycles of protest 
are to be constantly expected (Tarrow, 1989, 1998).
A dualistic process model of institutional emergence differs from all these models for several 
reasons, with crucial implications for research. It conceptualizes the emergence of an institution as 
a series of framing contests punctuated by several turning point mechanisms tending to have a 
localized effect, i.e. on one side of the interaction. This has serious methodological and conceptual 
implications as it forces researchers to broaden the scope of their investigation by analysing and 
theorizing the activities and behavioural repertoires not only of challengers but also of defenders 
of the status quo. It also shows that institutional and political processes are tightly intertwined and 
that, despite the input of so-called cultural frame institutionalism, more work is required in this 
direction to have a better understanding and a wider mapping of the mechanisms that explain 
observed turning points.
Conclusion
Responding to the call of scholars for more work on the role of social movements in institutional 
emergence (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008), this study examined how 
proponents and opponents of the introduction of a new norm engage in framing contests over time. 
To address this issue, we drew on an in-depth case study of the emergence of a de facto standard, 
namely the diesel particulate filter (DPF) for diesel cars in Germany. By developing a dualistic 
process model of institutional emergence, this study makes three contributions to the institutional 
literature. First, we show that turning point mechanisms are central to understanding how framing 
and mobilization activities of a social movement can push their cause forward in order to shape the 
next phase, which can eventually lead to institutional emergence. Second, our results suggest that 
those under fire from a social movement tend to deploy buffering strategies to protect themselves 
from external aggression. Third, we show that institutional emergence may be the result of the 
power exercised by critical actors responding to the imperative of a social movement.
More work is needed to test the robustness of the dualistic process model of institutional 
emergence. In the same vein, more studies should examine how proponents and opponents of a 
cause engage framing contests and how these conflicts are maintained over time or are resolved 
when actors have extremely divergent interests. There is an acute need for further empirical 
studies to document and better understand how the strategies, tactics and action of the challeng-
ers and defenders of the status quo relate to one another. As it stands at this moment and as 
Hoffman (2011) observed for his studies on climate change, the literature tends to assume that 
the strategies of the challengers of the status quo are independent from the action of its defend-
ers. As such, we also call for more work documenting the reaction of those under fire from 
social movements and more specifically the forms that buffering strategies can take in different 
settings. We also call for more work documenting the forms and shapes that turning points may 
take in different cases of institutional emergence and the underlying mechanisms explaining 
shifts from one stage to another. Finally, we would like to see more explorations of the pro-
cesses of institutional emergence that do not assume that a general consensus constitutes the 
underlying mechanism.
Because our case study and our analysis investigated framing contests and different turning 
point mechanisms in detail, we believe that our results can be generalized to other similar settings. 
More specifically, we believe that our results can be generalized to settings characterized by intense 
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schisms between proponents and opponents of a cause, where the establishment of a consensus 
over a norm or a standard is highly unlikely. Settings where green technologies are promoted by 
activists, such as the case of the catalytic converter in the automotive industry (Wurzel, 2002), the 
photovoltaic technology in the energy sector, the commercialization of nanotechnology, and battles 
between environmentalists and the oil industry for lead-free and sulfur-free fuel, are likely to be 
characterized by a dualistic process model of institutional emergence. In a world featuring several 
divergent interests where deadlocks often dominate the scene, a dualistic process model of institu-
tional emergence may help to find ways to institutionalize solutions without having to wait for an 
institution to emerge out of a consensus.
Appendix. Dictionaries used for Automated Text Analysis.
Theme Scope Dictionary (in German)
Social 
movement
Covers the names of all major 
actors of the pro-DPF movement 
and their key slogans (e.g. ‘DUH’, 
‘No Diesel without Filter’)
bund fuer umwelt und naturschutz 
deutschland; duh; feinstaubalarm; 
feinstaubkatastrophe; feinstaubproblem; 
filterfrage; friedrich; greenpeace; gsf; 
kein diesel ohne filter; lottsiepen; nabu; 
naturschutzring; resch; russproblem; 
uba; umweltbundesamt; umwelthilfe; 
umweltorganisation; umweltschuetzer; 
umweltschutzorganisation; 
umweltverband; vcd; 
verkehrsclub deutschland; 
weltgesundheitsorganisation
Public health Covers terms identified to deal 
with the negative health effects 
of diesel PM (e.g. ‘lung cancer’, 
‘cardiovascular’)
atemwegserkrankung; blutbahn; 
blutkreislauf; gesundheitsgefaehrdung; 
gesundheitsrisiko; 
gesundheitsschaedlich; herzinfarkt; 
herzkreislauferkrankung; krebs; 
krebsausloesend; krebserkrankung; 
krebserregend; krebserzeugend; 
krebsfoerdernd; krebsgefaehrlich; 
krebsgefahr; krebsrisiko; krebstote; 
krebsverdaechtig; lebenserwartung; 
lunge; lungenabwehr; lungenblaeschen; 
lungenkrebs; lungenkrebsrisiko; 
todesfaelle; toetet; tote
ADAC and 
Peugeot
Covers terms that represent 
Peugeot (the French OEM who 
introduced the DPF technology) 
and ADAC (the automotive club 
that ran the first tests)
citroen; eolys; fap; filtre; particules; 
peugeot; psa; adac; allgemeine deutsche 
automobil club; allgemeiner deutsche 
automobil club
Regulatory 
intervention
Covers terms identified to deal 
with the idea of regulatory 
interventions favouring the DPF 
(e.g. ‘tax incentives’)
filterfoerderung; filterpflicht; 
foerderbeschluss; foerdergesetz; 
foerderkonzept; foerdern; foerderplan; 
foerderung; filterpflicht; steueranreiz; 
steuerentlastung; steuererleichterung; 
steuerfoerderung; steuervorteil
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Theme Scope Dictionary (in German)
Devaluation 
of cars 
without DPF
Covers terms identified to indicate 
the risk of future devaluations of 
cars without DPF (e.g. ‘residual 
value’, ‘new cars without’)
abschreibungsbedarf; an wert; eurotax 
schwacke; eurotaxschwacke; eurotax-
schwacke; gebrauchtfahrzeugrestwert; 
gebrauchtfahrzeugwert; 
gebrauchtwagenrestwert; 
gebrauchtwagenwert; neuwagen 
ohne; preisverfall; restwert; 
restwertkalkulation; schwacke; verelli; 
verrelli; wertkorrektur; wertverfall; 
wertverlust; wiederverkaufswert
Note. For the analyses, we used the scripting language Perl and the statistics software R. Besides the five themes shown, 
several other themes were analysed. All terms were converted to lower case and umlauts were substituted appropri-
ately. Then, terms were stemmed (using a German Porter stemmer) and regular expressions were used to capture 
word variations.
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Notes
1. According to Soule (2004) the only distinction between the concepts of framing and theorization is that 
theorization specifies who should adopt an innovation. We draw on both ideas in this study.
2. It should be noted that several suppliers offered affordable DPF retrofitting kits. However, these kits 
attain only 30 to 40 percent of the effectiveness of original equipment DPFs. For this reason, retrofitting 
was not an option to circumvent economic losses in case of tax incentives that are connected to tight PM 
emission limits.
3. Note that motivational frames are also present, but do not dominate the scene (see Figure 2).
4. Please note that we do use the term ‘threshold’ in the same way as Granovetter (1978) (see our comment 
in the discussion section).
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